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STANFORD v. KENTUCKY AND WILKINS v. MISSOURI: A
VIOLATION OF AN EMERGING RULE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution de-
clares, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' This lan-
guage is particularly susceptible to change because the words
"cruel" and "unusual" do not lend themselves to the ready creation
of a standard by which one can measure punishments. 2 Recognizing
that these words are imprecise and "that their scope is not static,"3
the courts have decided whether individual circumstances warrant
the given sentence under the eighth amendment on a case-by-case
basis and have not detailed the amendment's "exact scope. '4
In 1989, the Supreme Court inquired again as to the meaning
of the eighth amendment in the consolidated cases of Stanford v.
Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri.5 Whether the Justices should
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The people who drafted the eighth amendment in 1791
were accustomed to far more barbaric punishments than the people of today's society.
Nonetheless, burning at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel were prohibited.
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). Other punishments that appeared in the United
Kingdom's early history, such as public dissection and live disembowelment, similarly fell
into disfavor. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
Mr. Livermore, a participant in the congressional debate, opposed the clause due to
vagueness and shed light on the accepted practices of the era when he asked Congress:
"No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang
a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are
we, in [the] future, to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel?" Id. at 369 (citation omitted). The sparse debates on the adoption of the clause
reveal that a few representatives agreed with Livermore's assertion that the amendment
lacked value because it lent no guidance to decisionmakers on what punishments it
forbade. Id. Notwithstanding the lack of specificity, a considerable majority voted to
adopt the eighth amendment as proposed. Id.
2. Focusing on the final phrase of the eighth amendment alone, one may question
whether punishments must first be cruel or inhuman and second be unusual or apart
from the ordinary. The Court has not focused on the distinctions between the two terms
in its attempts to define the words, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality
opinion), nor has the Court established a bifurcated approach.
3. Id. at 100-01.
4. Id. at 99; see, e.g., Weerns, 217 U.S. at 366 (in which the Court upheld an unusually
long prison sentence for falsification of government records, reasoning that the eighth
amendment implies a concern with degradation rather than sentence length); O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331, 337 (1892) (in which the Court upheld a sentence of three
days of hard labor per dollar of earnings for the sale of intoxicating liquor without
authorization-totalling 19,914 days); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1878) (in
which public death by gunfire was not cruel and unusual punishment for premeditated
murder).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
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consider the practices of other nations and the mandates of human
rights instruments6 in deciding the constitutionality of a death
sentence under the eighth amendment is a source of controversy.
The Court's division on the question of what evidence should
inform the interpretation of the eighth amendment is of crucial
importance because disagreement in the highest tribunal of the
land may constitute evidence of an imminent breakthrough in the
jurisprudence of the Court.
Pro-abolitionists and commentators pin their hopes on interna-
tional law to influence the Supreme Court to prohibit juvenile
death sentences.7 Because four Justices considered international
law to be relevant in juvenile death penalty cases,' recognition of
international law by additional Justices could be of great conse-
quence. A majority of the Court might then consider the imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders to be cruel and unusual
in light of the world trend to abolish the death penalty altogether.9
Such a decision would more closely align the United States with
the practice of the majority of nations in the world. In addition,
the United States would be taking steps, through the Court,
toward becoming a more cooperative and contributing member of
the Organization of American States (OAS) in its endeavors to
recognize and promote human rights as a regional unit. 0
This Note first outlines the recent history of the death penalty,
examines its current status in the United States, and shows that
6. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties uses the word "instrument" to refer
to all written state acts. Such documents may include the text of treaties or subsequent
writings that serve to ratify, accept, or approve a treaty on behalf of a particular country.
C. PARRY & J. GRANT, ENCYLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (1986).
7. See Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655 (1983); Comment,
Death at an Early Age: International Law Arguments Against the Death Penalty for
Juveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 245 (1988).
8. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun considered international law to
be relevant in juvenile death penalty cases. See, e.g., Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2985-86
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
9. See Fox, The American Convention on Human Rights and Prospects for United States
Ratification, 3 HuM. RTS. 243, 262-65 (1973). Such a result appears likely because three
of the current Justices have cited international law in order to show that the result they
would reach would be consistent with the practice of other nations. See Stanford, 109 S.
Ct. at 2985-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 (plurality opinion).
10. President Carter informed the Senate in 1978 that the United States' abstention
from human rights treaties "'increasingly . . .prejudices United States participation in
the development of the international law of human rights.'" Hartman, supra note 7, at
657 n.9 (quoting Human Rights Treaties, President's Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 395 (Feb. 27, 1978)).
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the present interpretation of the eighth amendment does not
violate the United States' obligations under its membership in the
United Nations (UN) or the OAS. This Note next advances justi-
fications for courts to consider international law, even though
current agreements do not obligate such a consideration, and
explores the possible ramifications for juvenile offenders. Finally,
this Note reevaluates the positions of the Wilkins and Stanford
plurality and dissent to determine their respective degrees of
compliance with international law.
THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the
appeals of Kevin Stanford and Heath Wilkins in a consolidated
case." Both cases involved the imposition of death penalty sen-
tences upon persons generally considered to be juveniles following
their convictions for aggravated felonies. A year earlier, the Court
had carved out an area protecting persons fifteen years of age
and younger from the death penalty.' 2 Both appellants exceeded
the age of fifteen at the time of their crimes, however, and
therefore found themselves outside of the scope of the Court's
decision. 3
A juvenile court convicted Kevin Stanford for the shooting death
of a gas station attendant after he repeatedly raped and sodomized
her during the commission of a robbery. 4 Stanford was seventeen
years and four months of age at the time of the murder. 5 The
juvenile court waived jurisdiction under Kentucky law' 6 and tried
Stanford as an adult, convicting him and sentencing him to death.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty after
finding that no program of treatment in the juvenile system was
suitable for the defendant. 17 The court found that mitigating factors
11. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988); Wilkins v. Missouri, 487 U.S. 1233
(1988).
12. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38 (plurality opinion).
13. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2972-73.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2972.
16. Id. at 2973; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1982). This
statute provides that a court may waive jurisdiction either when the defendant is under
the age of 16 and charged with a Class A felony or a capital crime, or when the offender
is over the age of 16 and charged with a felony.
17. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987), afj'd sub nom. Stanford
v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). Petitioner Stanford had been in and out of juvenile
court and treatment programs since the age of 10. Efforts at rehabilitation were obviously
unsuccessful. The court reasoned that resubjecting Stanford to unproductive therapy only
to return him to the streets to continue the pattern of crime would be contrary to the
interests of the community and of petitioner himself. Id.
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such as the defendant's age and the possibility for his rehabilitation
were properly within the jury's discretion.'
In Wilkins, the defendant murdered a salesperson in a conven-
ience store. After Wilkins stabbed the victim once, the victim
tried to tell the defendant how to access the cash register and
then began pleading for her life, but her efforts to communicate
resulted in repeated episodes of stabbing.19 The defendant was
sixteen years and six months of age at the time he committed the
crime.2° Missouri's juvenile court terminated its juvenile proceed-
ings and certified Heath Wilkins for trial as an adult.2' Wilkins
received the death penalty. The Missouri Supreme Court found
no constitutional violation and affirmed his sentence.Y
Petitioners Stanford and Wilkins appealed to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the imposition of the death penalty on persons who
committed crimes as juveniles is cruel and unusual punishment
and is therefore prohibited by the eighth amendment. The Court
affirmed both decisions in a plurality opinion.2 The Justices agreed
that two interpretations of the words "cruel and unusual" exist.
The first precludes those punishments that society considered to
be excessive at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.?
The second prohibits those penalties contrary to "'evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "'25
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the Court,26 declared
from the outset that the eighth amendment prohibits more than
18. Id.
19. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
20. Id.
21. Id. Missouri law permits the State to try as adults persons who commit felonies
between the ages of 14 and 17. Mo. ANN. STAT. S 211.071 (Vernon 1990). Seventeen is
the age of majority for the purposes of criminal prosecution. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.021(1)
(Vernon 1990).
22. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Mo. 1987), aff'd sub noma. Stanford v. Kentucky,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). The court quickly dismissed the constitutional argument by referring
to Supreme Court precedent which established that the death penalty is not cruel and
unusual per se. Id. at 414 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976) (plurality
opinion)). Counsel for the defendant did not attempt to argue that the defendant's age
made the punishment cruel. Id.
23. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (plurality opinion).
24. Id. at 2974 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)). "There is now little
room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered
cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted." Ford, 477 U.S. at
405.
25. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
26. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
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those methods of punishment that eighteenth-century society la-
beled barbaric. The meaning of the words "cruel and unusual"
may change, and the Court must interpret those words in a
"dynamic manner." Although the entire Court accepted this prin-
ciple, the determination of these evolving standards split the
Justices.
Scalia stated that the "conceptions of decency" of "modern
American society as a whole" should govern over the Justices'
own senses of decency.28 In a footnote immediately following, he
added:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their
various amici that the sentencing practices of other countries
are relevant. While "the practices of other nations, particularly
other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a
practice uniform among our people is not merely an historical
accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text
permitting, in our Constitution as well," they cannot serve to
establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the
practice is accepted among our people. 9
In his search for objective indications of the public's conceptions
of unacceptable punishment, Scalia looked to the enactments of
state legislatures.s He found that such legislation did not establish
a national consensus that those offenders below the age of eighteen
should be free from the death penalty.31
27. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
28. Id. at 2974-75.
29. Id. at 2975 n.1 (citations omitted).
30. Of the 37 states permitting capital punishment, 15 states prohibited its use on 16-
year-old (and younger) offenders and 12 drew the line at 17 years of age. Id. at 2975.
31. Scalia reached his conclusion by comparing the percentages given in the present
case with the legislative statistics the Court utilized in another death penalty case, Tison
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1986). In Tison, defendants enabled their imprisoned father
and another convict to escape from prison. In the course of the getaway and a subsequent
robbery, one of the escapees shot and killed a family of four. Defendants testified that
they were surprised but made no effort to help the victims. Id. at 141. The Supreme
Court of Arizona affirmed defendants' death sentences based on an interpretation that
situations in which the offender intended or comprehended that deaths might occur
satisfied the "intent to kill" requirement. Id. at 143-44; see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982). To determine the constitutionality of this use of the death penalty, the Court
found "the state legislatures' judgment as to proportionality in these circumstances [to
be] relevant." Tison, 481 U.S. at 152. Of the 32 states permitting the use of the death
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, argued convincingly that the numbers Scalia relied upon
were distorted because they excluded from consideration the fif-
teen states that deem capital punishment excessive under all
circumstances. Brennan found that twenty-seven states prohibited
courts from sentencing an offender to death if he was below the
age of eighteen at the time he committed the crime.m More
importantly, Brennan recognized that such statistics were only
one kind of evidence to consider.P Although both sides looked to
the juries' application of the laws, Brennan's analysis reached
further to consider the opinions of respected organizations, 5 in-
ternational evidence as exemplified by legal statistics of other
nations,3 and human rights treaties.3 7
penalty, only 11 would preclude its use under the facts of this case, "powerfully sug-
gest[ing]" that society does not find the use of the death penalty to be grossly excessive.
Id. at 154.
32. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Brennan objected to the majority's approach, which turned over constitutional
interpretation to the political process. Id. at 2986-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He believed:
[The] very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
34. Scalia found jury approval of the death penalty for juveniles on the basis that
juries sometimes, even if rarely, imposed the penalty. Id. at 2977. Brennan countered
that only 1.37% of the inmates on death row are juvenile offenders, showing that jury
approval is unusual, and that the Court's jurisprudence has never considered a jury's
decision to be dispositive of the constitutionality of an issue. Id. at 2984 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). An assessment of juries is relevant, however, because one purpose of jury
sentencing is "to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (plurality opinion), in an effort to
give effect to the "evolving standards of decency." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
35. Such organizations include the American Bar Association, the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the American Law Institute, and the National
Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws. Similarly, religious organizations
and parent groups such as the National Parents and Teachers Association present
important indicia of Americans' views. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2984-85 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
36. Brennan noted that more than 50 nations have abolished the death penalty or
severely limited its use. Id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This figure includes nearly
all of the countries of Western Europe. Id. Of the eight juvenile executions (under age
18) worldwide since 1978, five occurred in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Barbados.
The remaining three occurred in the United States. Id.
37. Id. Brennan mentioned article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Human Rights (see infra note 114 and accompanying text), article 4(5) of the
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In sum, the Supreme Court Justices are split in their analysis
of juvenile death penalty cases. To some of the Justices, only state
legislative statistics are relevant to determining the age at which
the public accepts the imposition of the death penalty. The other
Justices look to a variety of sources, including international law,
to interpret the words "cruel and unusual."' '
MODERN APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The United States moved away from mandatory death penalties
in the nineteenth century in order to enable factfinders to con-
sider the individual circumstances and characteristics of the de-
fendants. 40 This move resulted in a great deal of discretion, which
led to arbitrary results. 41 In 1972, the Supreme Court found in
Furman v. Georgia42 that such arbitrariness violated the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. In Furman, the Court did not decide
whether the death penalty was per se unconstitutional, but rather
opined that guidelines were necessary for its fair application.
43
Although the Court's decision in Furman invalidated only Geor-
gia's statute, many state courts thereafter struck down their own
death penalty statutes after determining that they would fare
no better under a similar challenge in the Supreme Court.44 The
American Convention on Human Rights (see infra note 136 and accompanying text), and
article 68 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (see infra note 123 and accompanying text). Although Justice O'Connor
concurred in the decision of the Court and joined the portion of Scalia's opinion containing
the footnote that excludes international norms from consideration, she never addressed
the subject.
38. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975-77; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865-68 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Kennedy looked
only to the legislative statistics of the states. (Although Kennedy joined in the Court's
opinion in Stanford, he did not take part in the Thompson decision). To a more limited
extent, these Justices also looked at the sentencing behavior of juries. Stanford, 109 S.
Ct. at 2977; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 (Scalla, J., dissenting). The Justices have specifically
rejected the consideration of international law. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 n.1; Thompson,
487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2986 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31
(plurality opinion). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun looked to inter-
national law.
40. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982). Justice Powell explained: "In this
country we attempted to soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees... and then
by committing use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury." Id. at
111.
41. Id.
42. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 290 Ala. 118, 274 So. 2d 298 (1973); Donaldson v. Sack,
265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
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Furman decision, in effect, suspended executions until the states
drafted new legislation. 45 No executions occurred in the United
States until 1977.46 With the new legislation in place after the
Furman decision, 3,000 people received the death penalty in the
next ten years.47 During this period, however, no executions of
juvenile offenders took place. 48
The increased use of the penalty led the Court to grant
certiorari in three death penalty cases in 1976 to answer whether
execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment under all
circumstances. In Gregg v. Georgia,49 the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the penaltys The Court accepted Georgia's bi-
furcated approach which first required a determination of guilt
or innocence and then, upon a finding of guilt and at least one
aggravating circumstance, considered whether any mitigating
factors existed which could relieve the person of the death
penalty.5' Likewise, the Court upheld Florida's and Texas' sta-
45. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.LV/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), reprinted
in 21.3 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 61, 73 (1988) [hereinafter Case 9647].
46. Id. Notably, no execution took place in the five years prior to Furman, id.,
evidencing the natural decline of the use of the death penalty in the United States.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Inter-American Commission consistently uses the term "juvenile" to refer
to persons under the age of 18.
49. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
50. Id. at 186-87 (plurality opinion). Interestingly, the Court supported its finding in
three ways. First, the Court brought forward evidence that the Framers accepted the
death penalty. Id. at 176-77. Secondly, the Court pointed out that punishment by death
had continued in the United States for two centuries. Id. at 177-78. Finally, the Court
pointed to the post-Furman flurry of legislation as evidence of the public's acceptance of
the death penalty, notwithstanding the convincing argument in Furman that modern
standards of decency forbade imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 179-81. In Furman,
Justice Brennan set out detailed statistics that demonstrated the American public's
increasingly prominent rejection of execution as appropriate punishment. Furman, 408
U.S. at 291-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Reliance on post-Furman legislation to dispute the argument in Furman that modern-
day citizens find the death penalty abhorrent and violative of human dignity is misleading
because American citizens had very little to do with the state legislatures' drafting
frenzy. States that enacted new death penalty statutes simply reacted to replace an
unconstitutional law with a constitutional one. Presumably, absent Furman, the states
would have continued a four-decade trend and employed the death penalty less frequently.
The use of the death penalty was grinding slowly to a halt until the Court in Furman
insisted upon legislation to clarify and guide the juries in applying the penalty. Clearly,
the states could have chosen to abolish the penalty instead of clarifying it and bringing
it to the forefront of the juries' attentions, but the legislation which at first glance
appeared to show a flurry of activity in support of the penalty was in fact a response to
the Court striking down the vague death penalty statute in Furman.
51. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92, 196-98 (plurality opinion).
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tutes because those statutes included guidelines that allowed
mitigation due to individual circumstances. 52
In 1978, the Court struck down Ohio's death penalty statute
in Lockett v. Ohio53 because it enumerated only three mitigating
factors for the factfinder to consider.- The Court held that the
jury must be able to consider as mitigating factors all aspects of
a defendant's character and record, including the age of the
defendant. 55 Similarly, in 1982, the Court held that statutes must
permit factfinders to consider the emotional and mental back-
ground of the offender in Eddings v. Oklahoma.-6 The Court
overturned the death sentence in Eddings because the lower
court did not give the defendant's upbringing enough weight in
its determination.57 Eddings was sixteen years of age at the time
he committed murder. The trial judge found the defendant's age
to be a mitigating factor but insufficient to outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances.'s Although the decisions in both Lockett
and Eddings stressed the youth of the defendants, the Court
refrained from addressing whether the use of the death penalty
for minors constitutes inherently cruel and unusual punishment.
In Eddings, the Court did, however, emphasize the importance
of considering age. 9 The Court described adolescence as the time
when a person is "most susceptible to influence and to psycho-
logical damage"60 and pointed out that the law recognizes the
immaturity and irresponsibility of youths as compared to adults.6 1
The Court readily acknowledged that age is a "relevant mitigat-
ing factor of great weight. '6 2
52. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
53. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
54. Id. at 606-09 (plurality opinion). Unless the defendant proved one of the three
factors by a preponderance of evidence, the statute mandated the death penalty. The
three factors included inducement by the victim, duress or coercion, and mental deficiency.
Id. at 607 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(B) (Anderson 1987)).
55. Id. at 604.
56. 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
57. Id. at 116-17.
58. Id. at 108-09.
59. Id. at 115. The Court found Edding's turbulent family history "particularly relevant"
due to his youth. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 116. Three reasons for the differential treatment of minors are: (a) children's
particular vulnerability; (b) their inability to make informed decisions; and (c) their need
for parental guidance. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(regulating access of minors to abortion); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (restricting children's first amendment right to buy sexually oriented magazines).
62. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116.
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In 1987, the Court squarely faced the age issue in Thompson
v. Oklahoma.63 The Court held that the imposition of the death
penalty on persons below the age of sixteen at the time they
committed a crime violated the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.64 The Court found that a national consensus existed65 and
that the execution of a person in this category was generally
"abhorrent to the conscience of the community." 66 The Court's
review of legislative enactments influenced its decision. All of
the eighteen states that have established a minimum age in their
death penalty statutes require the defendant to be at least sixteen
years old at the time of the crime. The Court demonstrated that
the conclusions it drew from legislative patterns in the United
States were consistent with the abolition of the death penalty in
other nations, at least as concerns juveniles.6 7 An exploration of
the sentencing behavior of juries revealed further evidence of a
consensus.
68
After heavily weighing legislative and jury patterns, the Court
made the final determination of the scope of the eighth amend-
ment.69 The Court spoke of the youth's reduced culpability70 and
the fact that application of the penalty to juveniles does not
contribute "to the goals that capital punishment is intended to
63. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
64. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion).
65. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, did not appear as convinced that a
national consensus existed as a matter of constitutional law. O'Connor agreed that some
age exists below which a state could never constitutionally impose the death penalty,
and she found that the state should draw the line to protect those 16 and younger.
O'Connor disagreed, however, that the Court should hold as such. She would avoid
selecting any age cutoff and would encourage legislatures to generate such numbers. Her
more narrow ruling would find the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to petitioner
due to the absence of a specified minimum age in Oklahoma's death penalty statute. Id.
at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 832 (plurality opinion).
67. The United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union no longer enforce the
death penalty against juvenile offenders. The penalty applies only to such exceptional
crimes as treason and piracy in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. West Germany,
France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries abolished the death
penalty. Id. at 830-31.
68. Id. at 831. Of 82,094 persons arrested for homicide, 1,393 received death sentences.
Only five of these were individuals under the age of 16 at the time of the crime. The
disparity suggests that these five penalties constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 832-33.
69. See id. at 833-38.
70. Id. at 834 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion));
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)). Additional factors that differentiate
youths from adults as offenders include inexperience, lack of education, and less intelli-
gence. Id. at 835.
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achieve." 71 The Court labeled deterrence in this context "fanciful"
because fifteen-year-olds would not likely engage in a cost-benefit
analysis, weighing the possibility of punishment against the de-
sire to commit the crime.72 Even if they did, the Court noted
that the odds of execution at their age are so small that the
youths would probably dismiss the possibility of punishment by
death.73
The Juvenile System
State legislatures created juvenile courts because of the belief
that the state should rehabilitate children and not subject them
to the harshness of the adult criminal law system.74 "[O]ur accep-
tance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice
system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. ' 75 Limitations on juvenile court
jurisdiction vary from state to state, but most juvenile courts
lose jurisdiction over persons between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen. Not all persons meeting the jurisdictional requirements
of juvenile courts, however, will be subject to adjudication in
those courts.76 Under certain circumstances, a transfer out of
juvenile courts works to the youth's advantage, primarily because
the Constitution entitles the offender to all of the protections of
the adult system, but also because juries may be more sympa-
thetic. Along with those advantages, however, the youth risks
imposition of any of the adult penalties.77
In each of the death penalty cases before the Supreme Court,
either the age requirements in each jurisdictional state disqual-
71. Id. at 838.
72. Id. at 837-38.
73. Id. at 838.
74. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
75. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion). See generally Paulson,
Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REv.
167 (summarizing constitutional attacks on the juvenile court system and the system's
general resilience).
76. Most states permit the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction after the court
satisfies varying procedural requirements. The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example,
permits the juvenile court to transfer a case to another criminal court if the child is not
amenable to rehabilitation in the available juvenile facilities and if the court has "probable
cause to believe the child committed the delinquent act." VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-269 (1988).
Additionally, the child must be at least 15 years of age and not mentally retarded or
criminally insane. Id. In many states, the juvenile also possesses the right to waive the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See, e.g., id. § 16.1-270.
77. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
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ified the offender from juvenile court, or the offender was subject
to trial in the juvenile system but the prosecutor or the defendant
himself waived jurisdiction. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,78 the Court
drew a protective line to shield those under sixteen from the
death penalty of the adult system.7 9 The Court in Wilkins v.
Missouri and Stanford v. Kentucky ° considered whether the line
should more appropriately be drawn to protect those under
eighteen who found themselves outside of juvenile court.81 The
Court reaffirmed Thompson by asserting that the national con-
sensus would preclude execution only for those below the age of
sixteen.82
Nations outside of the United States have given great consid-
eration to the same question with which our Supreme Court
struggles. As a result of such consideration, many nations indi-
vidually abolished or restricted use of the death penalty within
their domestic legal system and took part in international human
rights movements. These movements culminated in the creation
of binding treaties, many of which contain provisions regarding
the death penalty.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS83
Until the 1940's, international law focused primarily upon the
relations between nations, leaving the treatment of nationals
within each nation's exclusive jurisdiction. In 1941, in response
to the Hitler era atrocities, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
proclaimed the humanistic ideals that formed the basis for the
78. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
79. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion). Although petitioners requested the Court to draw the
line to protect those under the age of 18, the Court, on the facts before it, had to consider
only the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to 15-year-olds. Id.
80. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
81. Id. at 2980 (plurality opinion).
82. Id. When faced with a 15-year-old offender in Thompson, four Justices in the
plurality included international law in their reasoning. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31
(Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, JJ., plurality opinion). After considering the
16- and 17-year-olds in the more recent case, the four Justices who admitted the relevancy
of international law switched their positions and became the dissenters.
83. Although international efforts to promote human rights are not limited to the
documents that this Note discusses, the following international agreements have played
a role in the Supreme Court's decisionmaking, see supra note 37, and in the OAS's finding
of a violation of human rights on the part of the United States, see infra text accompanying
notes 158-60.
84. Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments
and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
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strong belief shared by the Allied Nations that the time had
come to protect all humankind under international law. 5 The
United Nations Charter embodied the vision of these nations by
requiring all members of the UN to "promote .. .universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms."8 6 Although the document legally bound the countries
participating, the Charter was only a vague beginning. First,
nations pledged themselves to promote, but not necessarily to
observe, human rights. Second, the document did not include an
enumeration of the rights it promoted.
An alien plaintiff attempted to assert the supremacy of the
Charter's provisions over California's inconsistent Alien Land
Law in order to prevent the escheat of his property to the State
of California in the landmark case of Sei Fujii v. Staee.8 7 The
Supreme Court of California acknowledged that the Charter was
a treaty made under the authority of the United States and
therefore was part of the supreme law of the land. 8 Not all
treaties, however, automatically supercede inconsistent law. "A
treaty is 'to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the
aid of any legislative provision.' "89 When a treaty is non-self-
executing, it "'addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the Legislature must execute the contract, be-
fore it can become a rule for the court.' "90 The court found that
the Charter was clearly non-self-executing because it stated only
itgeneral purposes and objectives of the United Nations Organi-
zation."91 Although the plaintiff prevailed on other grounds, the
United Nations Charter had no effect upon the case.92
The Charter was significant, however, because it constituted
the first time that international law claimed an interest in the
protection of individuals, ignoring the traditional boundary be-
tween matters of universal concern and those within domestic
85. Id. at 2-3.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
87. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 720, 242 P.2d 617, 619 (1952) (citing CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 261,
§ 1, 2, 7 (Deering 1945)).
88. Id. at 721, 242 P.2d at 619-20; U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
89. Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d at 721, 242 P.2d at 620 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). Treaties that are automatically operative upon ratification are
termed "self-executing." Id
90. Id. (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314).
91. Id. at 722, 242 P.2d at 620. See id. at 723-24, 242 P.2d at 621-22 for a complete
analysis of the differences between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
92. Id. at 724-25, 737-38, 242 P.2d at 622, 630.
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sovereignty. 93 Human rights law, conceptualized in the Charter
and spelled out in detail in subsequent agreements, has created
an environment in which derogations by any nation may result
in criticism and efforts to prevent repetition of the internationally
illegal conduct.94 The United States actively participated in the
creation of these documents, which have given individuals new
rights and rendered illegal a wide variety of acts.
United Nations Membership
The United States is one of forty-nine original members of the
UN, which was organized in 1945 to promote peace and prosper-
ity.95 The General Assembly, which consists of up to five dele-
gates from each member nation,96 may consider and subsequently
recommend action on any question of world peace or security
except those issues reserved for the Security Council 97 or matters
within the internal affairs of the member states.98 A committee
of representatives, assigned to research matters and formulate
position statements, recommends resolutions for adoption by the
General Assembly.99 The General Assembly decides important
questions by a two-thirds majority of the members present and
voting; a simple majority vote decides all other questions.100 A
resolution adopted by the Assembly states the position of the
UN on a matter but does not legally bind any state unless that
state becomes a party to the particular convention or treaty.10
93. Buergenthal, supra note 84, at 4.
94. Id. at 4-5.
95. D. COYLE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND How IT WORKS 249-50 app. C (1966).
96. Id. at 181. Regardless of the number of representatives, each member nation has
one vote. Id. at 205.
97. Id. at 181. The Security Council has greater power than the General Assembly but
is involved only in "situations which are likely to endanger international peace and
security." U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 3. Being one of the five world powers in 1945, the
United States also serves as a member of the Security Council. Id. art. 23, para. 1. The
founders originally intended for the Security Council to command a military force to keep
world peace, but disagreement as to the proper use of force for peacekeeping has
prevented the realization of this goal. D. COYLE, supra note 95, at 182. Nations may still
consult the Security Council whenever a breach of the peace is imminent, but inaction
has diminished the power of the Council, resulting in an increase in the power of the
General Assembly to make recommendations. Id. at 182-83.
98. Id. at 181. What constitutes "internal affairs" is a controversial subject in the
Assembly. Id. The overall trend is for the UN to become increasingly involved as the
definition of internal affairs becomes more restricted over time. Id. at 181-82.
99. Id. at 181.
100. Id. at 182.
101. Id. at 201. The United Nations Charter empowers the UN to make recommenda-
tions only. See U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
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THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF 1948
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 2 was the product
of the Commission on Human Rights, chaired by Eleanor Roos-
evelt, which sought to identify common wrongs and to formulate
general principles to protect individuals from continued suffer-
ing.0 3
The Commission presented these principles in the form of a
covenant, ratification of which meant that the particular member
state pledged to promote the observance of the stated rights and
fundamental freedoms. 0 4 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration
states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."'0 5 The General Assembly
unanimously adopted the Declaration. 06
The preamble labels the Universal Declaration a "common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,' 0 7 and a
UN publication referred to it as a "formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting
importance are being enunciated."'08 The preamble is not binding
legally, 0 9 however, except insofar as it may constitute a state-
ment of customary international law."0 In Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,"' for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit relied upon the Declaration, among other sources,
as establishing that the international community abhors acts of
102. International Bill of Human Rights: A Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, reprinted in 2 D. DJONOVICH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS:
SERIES I: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 135 (1973) [hereinafter Uni-
versal Declaration].
103. D. COYLE, supra note 95, at 79.
104. Id.; see also U.N. CHARTER preamble.
105. Universal Declaration, supra note 102, at 137.
106. D. COYLE, supra note 95, at 80.
107. Universal Declaration, supra note 102, at 135-36.
108. 34 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc. Elcn.4l/610 (1962) (memorandum of
Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Secretariat).
109. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt explained to the General Assembly prior to the
adoption of the Declaration that one should keep in mind that the Declaration is not a
treaty. She admonished: "It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of
legal obligation." 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1965).
110. Consistent state practice creates customary international law, which binds the
practicing nations, as well as others, over time. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying
text. For support of the proposition that the Declaration has become binding as a part
of customary international law, see Nayar, Introduction: Human Rights: The United
Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816-17 (1978); Waldock,
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European
Convention, 11 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 15 (Supp. 1965).
111. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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torture and, therefore, that customary international law prohibits
such acts.112 Even if one argued that the Universal Declaration's
prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment legally bound
nations as a matter of international law due to universal adher-
ence to the Universal Declaration's mandates, courts are no closer
to resolving the meaning of those words, which parallel those in
the eighth amendment." 3
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Since 1948, nations and international organizations have drafted
more specific documents to enforce the ideals set forth in the
Universal Declaration. For example, the General Assembly also
adopted unanimously a resolution entitled the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights." 4 The United States partici-
pated in the drafting of this Covenant by means of representatives
who served on the Economic and Social Council.1 5 The Covenant
is more specific than the Declaration and asserts in article 6,
paragraph 5 that "[s]entences of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.""16
The Covenant, which member states opened for signature in
1966,117 became effective in 1976.118 The signature of a nation's
representative indicates the signatory's initial commitment to
consider taking the necessary steps to ultimately ratify the
document but does not normally bind the signatory.119 The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties2 ' imposes limited obligations
on signatories that do not ratify a document. Article 18 prohibits
the signatory from engaging in acts that would defeat the purpose
of the treaty. The obligation continues until the nation ratifies
the treaty or the signatory makes clear its intention not to
112. Id. at 882.
113. See supra text accompanying note 1 for the relevant text of the eighth amendment.
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter International Covenant].
115. Article 62 of the United Nations Charter empowers the Economic and Social
Council to conduct studies and make recommendations to the General Assembly with
respect to international economic, educational, cultural, health, and social matters. U.N.
CHARTER art. 62, para. 1.
116. International Covenant, supra note 114, art. 6, para. 5.
117. Id. art. 48, para. 1.
118. Id. at 172 n.1.
119. Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations, 44 AMER. J. INT'L
L. 333, 342-46 (1950).
120. 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
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become a party.121 Although the United States signed the Cove-
nant, it has not yet ratified the document. 122 Because article 48,
paragraph 2 requires ratification before the Covenant has binding
effect, the United States does not violate article 6, paragraph 5
by continuing to impose the death penalty.
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of Wares allows the use of the death penalty
when the accused committed a crime involving espionage or
serious acts of sabotage against the military of the occupying
state.' ? The Convention also permits capital punishment when
the accused intentionally caused the death of at least one person,
so long as the offense would have subjected the offender to the
same penalty under the law of the occupied territory as it existed
prior to occupation. 25 The final sentence of article 68 leaves no
doubt, however, that "[iun any case, the death penalty may not
be pronounced against a protected person who was under eighteen
years of age at the time of the offence.' 26 Although the Geneva
Convention's title suggests that its contents have effect only
during war, article 2 also refers to the implementation of certain
provisions in peacetime. 2a No qualifying clause restricts article
68 to wartime; it refers only to "protected persons." Article 4,
however, defines "protected persons" as persons held by a party
to the conflict or an occupying force of which they are not
nationals.les Obviously, then, the death penalty provisions of the
Geneva Convention are binding upon the United States only
under conditions of war.
Membership in the Organization of American States
The first conception of a regionally united America was implicit
in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, in which President James Monroe
121. Id. art. 18, at 686.
122. Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that states
may consent to be bound to a treaty by signature, ratification, or any other agreed-upon
means. Id. art. 11, at 684.
123. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention]. -
124. Id. art. 68, at 3560.
125. Id.
126. I& (emphasis added).
127. Id- art. 2, at 3518.
128. Id- art. 4, at 3520.
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declared that the United States has a special interest in the
unity of the hemisphere.'2 In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt
added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which went further
and actually asserted a United States' right to intervene in the
affairs of other American nations in order to keep peace. 30 This
assertion contravened American policy since 1889, when the
United States called the First International Conference of Amer-
ican States in order to promote beneficial reciprocal relations
between the nations of the Western Hemisphere. 3' Throughout
the occasional meetings of this Conference, the Latin American
states opposed the United States' asserted right of interven-
tion.13 2 The United States, over time, accepted the principle of
nonintervention'33 and a period of cooperation ensued.13 Desiring
to reinforce the productive new relationship, the nations formed
the Organization of American States and adopted its charter in
1948.135
The American Convention on Human Rights
In 1969, the OAS created the American Convention on Human
Rights, 3 also known as the San Jos6 Pact.3 7 The American
Convention created rights themselves,138 as well as the necessary
structures and organs responsible for their promotion. 13 9 The
Convention also established the first international tribunal in the
American States: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 40
129. D. ARMSTRONG, THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION: A SHORT HISTORY
98 (1982).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 99.
132. See R. LAWSON, INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 320-22 (1974).
133. D. ARMSTRONG, supra note 129, at 99. As Armstrong points out, articles 15 through
20 of the original Charter (articles 18 through 22 of the Charter as amended in 1967 and
1985) demonstrate the member states' acceptance of nonintervention. Id. at 100; see also
O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 18-22.
134. D. ARMSTRONG, supra note 129, at 99.
135. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM part 1, booklet 2, at 3 (T. Buer-
genthal & R. Norris eds. 1989) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
136. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/ser.
KIXVI/1.1, doe. 65 rev. 1 (1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 673 (1970)
[hereinafter American Convention].
137. Id. at 696.
138. For the enumerated civil and political rights, see id. arts. 3-25, at 676-83. Article
26 describes economic, social, and cultural rights. Id. art. 26, at 683.
139. Id. art. 33, at 685.
140. Id. arts. 52-73, at 690-94.
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This court serves in an advisory capacity 4 1 and enjoys conten-
tious jurisdiction for alleged violations of the rights that the
Convention created.142 Member states of the OAS or individuals
through the election of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights file complaints with the court. 43
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ
of the OAS, was designed to promote and defend human rights
and to serve as a consultative body in matters concerning human
rights. 44 The Commission gained additional responsibilities under
the Convention. 145 The Commission educates nations and "pro-
mote[s] the observance and protection of human rights."' 46 To
these ends, the Commission advises nations when a member state
so requests,' 47 in response to the petition of an individual or in
response to the communications of another member state,'148 re-
gardless of whether an individual brings a complaint. The Com-
mission has the power to encourage the member states to comply
with resolutions of the OAS and provisions of the Convention
when applicable. 149
The Convention permits the death penalty in countries that
have not yet abolished it for only the most serious of crimes.'0
No state, having abolished the penalty, may reinstate it,' 5' nor
may any state extend application of the death penalty to crimes
for which it does not currently apply. 52 Finally, the Convention
does not allow the death penalty for pregnant women or persons
over seventy or under eighteen years of age at the time of the
crime.'53
The United States participated in the drafting of the Conven-
tion and is a signatory, but never accepted the document in its
141. The court may assist states by interpreting treaties concerning human rights or
by giving its opinion as to the compatibility of a state's laws with the Convention. Id.
art. 64, at 692.
142. Id. art. 62, para. 3, at 692.
143. Id. arts. 48-50, 61, at 688-89, 691.
144. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States,
Feb. 27, 1967, art. 12, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 310, 342 (1967) [hereinafter Protocol].
145. See generally Volio, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 30 Am. U.L.
REv. 65 (1981).
146. Protocol, supra note 144, at 342.
147. American Convention, supra note 136, art. 41, para. e, at 686.
148. Id. art. 41, para. f, at 686.
149. Volio, supra note 145, at 69-70.
150. American Convention, supra note 136, art. 4, para. 2, at 676.
151. Id. art. 4, para. 3, at 676.
152. Id. art. 4, para. 5, at 676.
153. Id.
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entirety.5 4 In 1978, President Carter unsuccessfully encouraged
Congress to ratify the American Convention. 5 5 The Reagan admin-
istration did not resubmit it.15 Without ratification, other countries
cannot hold the United States to the provisions of the Convention,'5
7
even though as a member of the OAS the United States remains
subject to the recommendations of the Commission, which may
include input from the court in the form of an advisory opinion.'-'
The Commission may make recommendations to the United States
even though the United States is not a party to the Convention
due to the Commission's dual role as an organ of the American
Convention and the OAS. 159 In 1987, the Commission issued a report
to the United States that found the United States in violation not
of the Convention, but of another resolution of the OAS. 16°
154. See generally United States: Report of the Delegation to the Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Human Rights (Apr. 22, 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 710 (1970). The delegation reported that the United States was unsuccessful
in removing the proscription of capital punishment for certain age groups from the draft
of the Convention. Id. at 716. The draft did not conflict with the Constitution but was at
odds with some federal legislation, forcing the delegation to abstain from the vote on
article 4. Id. at 717.
155. Fox, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Violation,
82 AMER. J. INT'L L. 601, 603 (1988). In 1978, President Carter submitted the American
Convention on Human Rights, the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the
Senate for approval. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUR TREATIES
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. C, D, E, & F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
[hereinafter MESSAGE]. The President recommended that a non-self-executing provision
limit the treaties, with subsequent legislation to implement the treaties to govern federal
law. Id. at 18; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 313 (1829) (distinguishing between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties). Specifically focusing on the American
Convention, Carter proposed ratification with a reservation as to article 4 and other
articles. MESSAGE, supra, at 18. He suggested that the United States enter its reservation
as follows: "United States adherence of Article 4 is subject to the Constitution and other
laws of the United States." Id.
156. Fox, supra note 155, at 603.
157. American Convention, supra note 136, art. 74, para. 2, at 694.
158. The court may render an advisory opinion even if a member state of the OAS
does not accept the jurisdiction of the court over a particular matter. Restrictions to the
Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion No. OC-3/83 (Sept. 8, 1983), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 320, 330
(1984). Acceptance of jurisdiction is necessary only in contentious cases. Id.
159. Article 53 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
authorizes the Commission to organize its own activities and appoint the "persons
necessary to carry out any activity related to its mission." Regulations of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
51-52 (1988). The Commission relies on article 53 as authority for the advisory opinions
it renders. See Case 9647, supra note 45, at 64.
160. Case 9647, supra note 45.
180
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man161
is similar in nature to the UN's Universal Declaration in that
both documents merely declare general principles of human rights.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee, created for the Inter-
American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace (Mexico
City, 1945), prepared the first draft of the American Declaration,
which the Ninth International Conference of American States
(Bogota, 1948) adopted with revisions.162 The member states of
the OAS clearly did not intend for this document to bind them
legally, but rather adopted it as a resolution containing common
standards of treatment which the states desired to protect. 16
Although the OAS created numerous other resolutions gener-
ally arising from the text of the American Declaration, not until
1980 did the OAS significantly promote the general human rights
principles contained in the Declaration.' T The OAS implemented
the proclaimed principles by incorporating the American Decla-
ration into the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. 65 Article 2 of the statute in effect authorizes the
Commission to refer to the provisions of the American Declara-
tion to determine whether any member nation has violated an
individual's human rights.' Revisions of the OAS Charter gave
additional significance to the Declaration. 6 7 In 1987, the Commis-
sion found that the United States' practice of executing juveniles
violated the American Declaration.168
In an unsuccessful attempt to intervene in the executions of
juveniles James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton, the Commission
contacted the governors of the concerned states and the United
States Secretary of State. 69 Although the Declaration does not
161. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/ser.
L.IVIII.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1975), reprinted in T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 285-89 (1st ed. 1982)
[hereinafter American Declaration].
162. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 135, part 1, booklet 5, at i.
163. Id.
164. 2 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 135, part 1, booklet 9, at 1 (1980).
165. Id.
166. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 135, part 1, booklet 5, at i.
167. See generally Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human
Rights, 69 AMER. J. INT'L L. 828 (1975).
168. Case 9647, supra note 45, at 87.
169. The Commission attempted to intervene in the cases of Pinkerton v. McCotter,
No. 81-CR-0387D (105th D. Ct. Nueces Co. May 30, 1981), reh'g denied, 660 S.W.2d 58
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include any specific provisions regarding the death penalty, the
Commission found that the United States violated article 1 of
the American Declaration, which proclaims that "[e]very human
being has the right to life."'170 Petitioners Pinkerton and Roach
argued that the Commission could interpret this phrase by re-
ferring to customary international law, which they contended
prohibited "the imposition of the death penalty on persons who
committed capital crimes before completing eighteen years of
age.' 171 The Commission rejected this argument due to the United
States' continual refusal to conform to the prohibition. 72 The
Commission, however, did not say that this prohibition or norm
has been established as a matter of customary international law,
but rather that "[s]ince the United States has protested the norm,
it would not be applicable to the United States should it be held
to exist."'73 The Commission went on to state that the norm may
bind a dissenting nation only if the norm acquires the status of
jus cogens. 74 In a very limited section of the report, the Commis-
sion decided that the ban against executing juveniles is a practice
that has attained the status of jus cogens and that the United
States is therefore legally obligated to cease executions, regard-
less of its practice of dissenting. 175 The Commission insisted that
the United States actually accepts the prohibition on the execu-
tion of "children" by virtue of its juvenile court system, which
protects youths from harsh adult penalties. 76
At least one writer laments the Commission's failure to explain
further its conclusion that the norm had reached the status of
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985), stay of execution of death sentence
denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986), and State v. Shaw (and Roach), 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957 (1979), cert. denied sub. nom. Roach v. South Carolina, 444 U.S.
1026 (1980).
170. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 135, part 1, booklet 5, at 2.
171. Case 9647, supra note 45, at 77.
172. Id. at 78. See infra notes 195-99, 260-63 and accompanying text for an explanation
of customary international law and the effect of dissenting from a practice.
173. Case 9647, supra note 45, at 78.
174. Id. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 120, explains the concept of
jus cogens as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." Case 9647, supra note 45,
at 78 n.3. The Commission considered genocide to be such a norm. Id. at 79.
175. Case 9647, supra note 45, at 80. The United States argued that although the
proposition that the state should not punish children by death is generally true, no
consensus exists as to the age of majority. Id. at 71. To the Commission, the issue was
not the age of majority, but whether the United States' failure to prohibit executions
under the age of 18 as a matter of federal law violated the American Declaration. Id. at
82.
176. Id. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the juvenile
justice system.
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jus cogens.177 Conceptual inconsistency was rampant in the Com-
mission's reasoning. Customary international law and universally
binding general principles of international law constitute the
second and third levels of international commitment. The first
level consists of sporadic practices of nations; as a general rule,
these practices do not bind any nation. At the second level, more
nations participate in a particular practice that becomes common
and widespread, and the international community labels this norm
a rule of customary international law. The custom binds the
practicing nations and all other nations that are aware of the
norm and have not dissented openly. At the final level, nations
may not deviate from those practices that have achieved the
status of jus cogens, or peremptory obligations. To achieve such
a status, the whole international community must recognize the
norm.178 If a custom is not even prevalent enough to be binding
as a matter of customary international law,'79 which requires
common and widespread practice, then the Commission's conclu-
sion defies logic by implicitly deciding that the prohibition is a
matter of universal acceptance similar to the prohibition against
genocide. 80 The greater commitment necessarily includes the
lesser.
Whatever the Commission's opinion, the Commission is not an
international court with the power to decide cases with binding
results. 81 Although the United States may benefit from consid-
ering the Commission's view because the Commission is an organ
of the OAS and is composed of international experts,'182 the United
States is not legally compelled to do so.
The obvious conclusion from a review of all relevant human
rights treaties is that the United States is currently free from
binding international agreements regarding the eighth amend-
ment. Treaties are likely to remain a "particularly unpromising"
means of injecting international human rights law into United
States courts. 83 The courts hesitate to deem treaties as self-
177. Fox, supra note 155, at 601-02.
178. Vienna Convention, supra note 120, art. 53, at 698-99.
179. The Commission states bluntly that it is "convinced by the U.S. Government's
argument that there does not now exist a norm of customary international law establishing
18 to be the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty." Case 9647, supra note
45, at 82.
180. Id. at 80.
181. Fox, supra note 155, at 602.
182. Id. at 602-03.
183. Bilder, Integrating International Hurnan Rights Law Into Domestic Law-U.S.
Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1981).
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executing, so that even in the unlikely event that the United
States was to ratify a current treaty, the United States would
consider itself bound only if Congress enacted legislation to
provide for the content of the agreement. 1' "[S]ubtle factors of
national pride,"'185 particularly with respect to the constitutional
system of protection, also prevent the United States from ad-
mitting that any need exists to look to international human rights
law.186
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RELIANCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
PURPOSES OF INTERPRETATION
When one understands that outside sources must be used to
interpret the eighth amendment, the inquiry turns to the iden-
tification of proper indicia of societal consensus. As noted pre-
viously, the courts have looked to state death penalty statutes,
juries' willingness to impose the penalty, other legislative indi-
cations that help to define the point at which youths become
functioning, responsible adults, and, occasionally, the practices of
foreign nations, including involvement in human rights treaties. 87
A plurality in Thompson v. Oklahoma'8 relied upon the compila-
tion of all of these statistics; the Wilkins and Stanford plurality
rejected the use of all but legislative patterns revealed by state
death penalty statutes and jury behavior. 189 The four Supreme
Court Justices explicitly rejecting the use of international law
as a source' 90 may be overlooking some very important justifi-
cations and possibly even a mandate for the consideration of
international practice.
Theoretical Justifications from a Domestic Point of View
The literature contains two theories that may justify the in-
clusion of international law in domestic analysis of the eighth
amendment. 9' The first theory incorporates international law into
federal common law,'192 which is superior to inconsistent state law
184. Id.; see, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
185. Bilder, supra note 183, at 9.
186. Id.
187. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823-31 (1988) (plurality opinion).
188. 487 U.S. 815.
189. See supra notes 28-30, 65-68 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 38.
191. Hartman, supra note 7, at 659-98; Comment, supra note 7, at 257-63.
192. Hartman, supra note 7, at 659-86; Comment, supra note 7, at 257-60.
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under the supremacy clause.193 The second utilizes international
law to inform the courts' interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment. 94 The analysis of both theories requires a general under-
standing of the concept of customary international law.
Customary international law is created through the general
and consistent practices of states, which occur due to a sense of
legal obligation. 95 Customs established in this way become legally
binding'9 upon satisfaction of the following requirements: (1) the
identification of a consistent state practice that asserts a value
judgment and (2) evidence that the practicing state believes that
a legal obligation exists.'9 Nations need not practice the custom
unanimously. 9 Rather, the practice must "reflect wide accep-
tance among the states particularly involved in the relevant
activity.' 199
Federal Common Law
The Supreme Court held in The Paquete Habana2°° that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. '20 ' In First National City Bank
v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba,202 the Court re-
cently reaffirmed this principle. Commentators rely upon these
cases to assert the theory that norms of international law over-
rule inconsistent state law because international law is part of
federal common law.20 3
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See Bilder, supra note 183, for a detailed discussion of settled
federal law.
194. Hartman, supra note 7, at 687-98; Comment, supra note 7, at 260-63.
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
196. Id. S 102(1)(a).
197. Id. 102(2). For example, the International Court of Justice held that the principle
of equidistance that Denmark used to delimit the Continental Shelf did not rise to the
status of a principle of customary law because nations used the principle sporadically
and because concerns other than a sense of legal obligation motivated the principle's use.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44-46 (Feb.
20, 1969).
198. Hartman, supra note 7, at 683.
199. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, S 102 comment b.
200. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
201. Id at 700. The Court refers to customary international law.
202. 462 U.S. 611, 622-23 (1983).
203. See Hartman, supra note 7; Comment, supra note 7; see also The Antelope, 23 U.S.
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In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,20 4 Justice Brandeis asserted that
"[t]here is no federal general common law. ' 20 5 Although the issue
in Erie was purely domestic, the dictum's effect upon interna-
tional law quickly received attention from Judge Philip C. Jessup,
among others.20 6 Jessup posited that if one accepted literally the
dictum of Brandeis, then the traditional view of international law
as part of the law of the land, presented in The Paquete Habana,
actually would be referring to the law of the states.207 Following
the same line of reasoning, the Supreme Court would not be able
to review a matter involving international law that was adjudi-
cated by the state courts, as the issues would involve only
findings of state law.20 8 In repudiating the Erie dictum in the
context of international law, Jessup wrote:
The application of international law by the federal courts does
not need to be justified by the theory that we took over
international law as part of the common law. International law
is applied by the courts of many countries who look back upon
no inheritance from England .... The duty to apply it is one
imposed upon the United States as an international per-
son .... It would be as unsound as it would be unwise to
make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing
the rules of international law. 20 9
Jessup's views represent the modern conception of international
law as part of domestic federal law.210
(10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (determining the illegality of slave trade under international law);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199 (1796) (applying international law to confiscation of
property of British subjects located in the United States); Comment, supra note 7, at 256
n.85.
204. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
205. Id. at 78.
206. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law
(Editorial Comment), 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
207. Id. at 742.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 743.
210. Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555,
1555 (1984). The Court adopted Judge Jessup's views in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964), which repudiated the applicability of Erie in the
context of international law. Henkin explained that employing the term "federal common
law" to refer to international law is misleading. Although international law is similar to
federal common law in that both are supreme over state law and Supreme Court
interpretations of both are binding upon the states, federal common law differs in that
such law is judge-made and created pursuant to constitutional or congressional authority.
Henkin, supra, at 1561-62. For the purposes of consistency with the publicists referred
to in this Note, the definition of the term "federal common law" will continue to include
international law.
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The supremacy clause ensures that the Constitution, laws of
the United States, and treaties shall be supreme over state law.211
Because federal common law enjoys status equal to federal sta-
tutes and treaties for jurisdictional purposes,212 the courts should
interpret the supremacy clause similarly to include federal com-
mon law.21 3 Customary law, as a particular subspecies of inter-
national law, is not enumerated specifically in the Constitution
but is the equivalent of a treaty in international law and is
therefore also superior to state law.214 Customary law is self-
executing, or automatically binding, in the domestic system.
215
If one accepts that international law is part of the federal
common law, which by analogy to the jurisdictional clauses of
the Constitution is equal to federal law and treaties for the
purpose of the supremacy clause, then international law could
invalidate inconsistent state law. In the context of the juvenile
death penalty, one must be willing to assume further that cus-
tomary law is equal in status to positive international law and
that a rule of customary law precludes the execution of juveniles
in the United States. If one accepts each of the above proposi-
tions, then one could theoretically invalidate state laws that
permit the execution of persons who committed crimes while
under the age of eighteen without resort to the eighth amend-
ment.21
6
The federal common law theory presents several difficulties.
First, the application of international norms to the conflict in The
Paquete Habcana occurred only because of the absence of domestic
211. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
212. Id. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 1.
213. Hartman, supra note 7, at 662.
214. Henkin, supra note 210, at 1564-65. The Restatement of Foreign Relations supports
the view that customary international law also constitutes federal common law. RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 195, S 111 comment d.
215. Henkin, supra note 210, at 1566.
216. Note that in order for preemption of state law to occur, Congress must intend to
pervade the area of law, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
151-52 (1980) (pervasive federal legislation preempted state tax laws applicable to Indian
reservations), or a need for uniformity must exist, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 540-43 (1977) (uniformity of food weight labeling necessary to facilitate value
comparisons). Obviously, congressional intent is irrelevant in the absence of a domestic
legislative process. A need for uniformity does exist, however, justifying preemption of
state law by customary international law as part of the law of the United States.
Hartman, supra note 7, at 662. Henkin implicitly asserts that international questions
inherently give rise to a need for uniformity of interpretation when he states that "[it
made no sense that questions of international law should be treated as questions of state
rather than federal law . . . determined independently, finally and differently by the
courts of fifty states." Henkin, supra note 210, at 1559.
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law addressing the issues.217 Similarly, the principles governing
First National City Bank were common to both international law
and federal common law.218 In neither case did a principle of
international law conflict with state law. In fact, no court has
decided a case in which customary international law invalidated
inconsistent domestic law.21 9 Juvenile death penalty abolitionists
encounter another problem under this theory; that is, the lack of
conclusive evidence that "the eighteenth birthday [is] the magical
moment of full moral responsibility" as a matter of customary
international law.20 Unless courts can draw the line in a concrete
manner, the application of international law would invalidate only
sentences in which the factfinders did not consider youth,2 1 as
in Eddings v. Oklahoma.22 Additionally, the isolationism of the
United States and attitudes of positivist judges who believe that
no legitimate international law exists2m form tremendous barriers
which prevent any significant use of this theory of justification.2 4
International Norms as Informing Interpretation
The second theory, which Hartman referred to as "weak"
due to the less significant role that international law plays in
the decisionmaking process, is much more realistic. Under this
theory, courts consider international norms within the framework
of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court has occasion-
ally employed this comparative approach. Even as early as 1948,
four Justices noted in their concurring opinions that the majori-
ty's opinion was consistent with the human rights provisions of
the United Nations Charter.2 26 Since then, the Justices have
mentioned in footnotes that other nations do not permit the
217. "[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
218. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 623 (1983).
219. Hartman, supra note 7, at 687.
220. Id. at 680.
221. Id.
222. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
223. See Hartman, supra note 7, at 670-79.
224. Id. at 686-87.
225. Id. at 659, 687-98.
226. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50, 673 (1948) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge, JJ., concurring) (striking down certain provisions of the California Alien Land
Law on equal protection grounds).
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imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman
22
or for participation as an accomplice in a felony murder.2 In
Thompson v. Oklahoma,m the Court showed a slightly greater
reliance on international norms. The information regarding the
international status of the death penalty for juveniles appeared
in the text as one of the many relevant pieces of evidence that
the plurality considered.20
In addition to the traces of international law in Supreme Court
opinions, a number of lower federal court opinions make stronger
use of similar arguments. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile,231 the
relatives of an assassinated Chilean ambassador brought a wrong-
ful death action against the Republic. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia found that Chile's acts violated
international law, and the court imposed liability under the Fed-
eral Sovereign Immunities Act.22 In another wrongful death
action, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,m the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held a Paraguayan official accused
of torturing a Paraguayan citizen liable under the United States
Alien Tort Statute.2 The court found that torture violated in-
ternational customary law.2 5 Finally, in Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti,26 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida employed international legal standards con-
cerning the treatment of aliens and found a violation of the
constitutional rights of Haitian refugees.2 7
Federal courts have also employed international standards in
cases of purely domestic concern. For example, in Fernandez v.
Wilkinson,m the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas examined international treatment of prisoners and de-
cided that a federal prison had unconstitutionally detained a
Cuban refugee.2 9 Likewise, in Lareau v. Manson,240 the United
227. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-93 n.4, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion).
228. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982).
229. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
230. Id. at 830-31 (plurality opinion).
231. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-1611 (1982).
233. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
234. 28 U.S.C. S 1350.
235. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
236. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
237. Id. at 532.
238. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affid sub nora. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
239. Id. at 795-800.
240. 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980).
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States District Court for the District of Connecticut consulted
international standards of prohibited overcrowding and found a
constitutional violation.241
In Sterling v. Cupp,242 the Supreme Court of Oregon conducted
a similar review of international law when considering whether
searches of male inmates by female prison guards infringed upon
the prisoners' rights. The court perused such documents as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,243 the International Cov-
enant of Civil and Political Rights,244 and the European2 5 and
American Conventions. 246 The court emphasized that "[t]he vari-
ous formulations in these different sources in themselves are not
constitutional law. 24 7 Rather, the court cited the documents "as
contemporary expressions of the same concern with minimizing
needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing treatment of pri-
soners that is expressed in article I, section 13 [of the Constitu-
tion]."2 8
In each of these cases, the courts acted "out of a sense of
obligation which implies that these norms have attained a status
above that of being mere guidelines-they are being accorded
legally binding effect."249 In other words, the courts identified
rules of customary international law prohibiting assassination,
torture of political dissidents, brutal treatment of refugees, un-
reasonable overcrowding, offensive searches, and unlawful deten-
tion in prisons. One commentator termed the principles contained
in these decisions "a legal arsenal of persuasive arguments which
have resulted in announcements of protection for the rights of
individuals. ' '25 The arsenal exists, however, only to the extent
that a principle is accepted widely.
Some argue that customary international law has established
a prohibition of death sentences for persons under the age of
241. Id. at 1189-95.
242. 290 Or. 611, 622 n.21, 625 P.2d 123, 131 n.21 (1981).
243. Universal Declaration, supra note 102.
244. International Covenant, supra note 114.
245. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
246. American Convention, supra note 136; Sterling, 290 Or. at 622 n.21, 625 P.2d at
131 n.21.
247. Sterling, 290 Or. at 622, 625 P.2d at 131.
248. Id.
249. Note, The Application of International Human Rights Arguments in United States
Courts: Customary International Law Incorporated into American Domestic Law, 8 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 207, 218 (1982).
250. Id. at 220.
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eighteen.s 1 The prohibition, however, has not clearly reached the
necessary level of universality and consistency that international
law requires. A determination of the age at which protection
from adult punishments ceases is crucial to juvenile offenders.
The human rights treaties specify eighteen as that age. The
particular practices of the states that are parties to the conven-
tions do not establish a rule of customary international law
because those states act not under a sense of obligation, but
rather under a contractual duty which commenced with ratifica-
tion.22 From the actions of these states, which correspond with
the treaty's contractual provisions, "no inference could legiti-
mately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary
international law. ''25
Treaties and customary international law exist in three possible
scenarios. First, a treaty can be a document filled with ideals
and goals for nations which does not embody customary law but
attempts to create it in a futuristic sense.2 m Alternately, a treaty
may codify customary law. 255 Finally, the provisions of a treaty
may become customary international law, binding upon nonmem-
ber nations, through universal acceptance of the principles the
treaty proclaims.256 Clearly, the specific preclusion of the death
251. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 256. For the purposes of her analysis, Hartman
assumes that enough evidence exists to establish a rule of customary international law
precluding juvenile death penalties. See generally Hartman, supra note 7, at 670-82.
252. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1968 I.C.J. 3, 43
(Feb. 20, 1969).
253. Id.
254. Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, states:
"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country:' Universal Declaration, supra note 102. Although many nations have opened
their borders, more than 40 years after its passage, this declaration remains an ideal and
not reality. When no binding rule of customary international law existed prior to the
treaty and the member states did not universally ratify the document with the intent to
implement the provisions, the subsequent activities of member states do not establish
the rule because their obligation is contractual and is not the result of opinio juris.
On the other hand, some treaties embody established principles of law. Article 5 of
the Universal Declaration, for example, requires that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture." The world's abhorrence of a state's torture of a citizen was therefore already
clear in 1948. Certainly, the prohibition against torture existed as a matter of customary
international law by 1969, when the drafters of the American Convention of Human
Rights included an identical clause prohibiting torture in Article 5(2). American Conven-
tion, supra note 136. In this case, the practice of the states prior to signing the treaty
created the obligation under the principles of customary international law. Inclusion of a
treaty provision that is already binding law is redundant but desirable because a signed
contract simplifies and clarifies duties for future reference.
255. Vienna Convention, supra note 120, art. 38, at 694.
256. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16) (the principle of
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penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen in the human
rights treaties was not an adoption of already existing customary
law,257 and nations have not universally accepted the particular
treaty provisions pertaining to the death penalty.2s The rule,
then, appears to be a goal for eventual compliance by all nations.
Therefore, the only legitimate way to explore the creation of a
rule of customary international law that would prohibit the ju-
venile death penalty is to determine the practices of nations prior
to the creation of the American, European, or African conventions
on human rights 259 in order to establish a consistent state practice
coupled with opinio juris and, in addition, to look to the practices
of the nations presently uninvolved in the treaties or with re-
servations to the death penalty clauses to prove sufficient uni-
versal compliance to establish the norm as a rule of customary
international law. Research reveals no such attempt.
Effect of Dissenting from Custom
Both the federal common law and constitutional interpretation
theories can function only upon the establishment of a norm of
customary international law. Even if one agrees that a norm does
exist that precludes the application of the death penalty to
juveniles under the age of eighteen, a protesting nation may
carve out an exception for itself from the rule. 20 Generally,
international tribunals interpret silence regarding a developing
self-determination that the United Nations Charter announced in article 54 has become
binding on all states due to the development of international law subsequent to the
creation of the Charter).
257. Even today, 61 countries that impose the death penalty in practice do not
distinguish juveniles from adult offenders. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2985
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some of these nations are parties to treaties that preclude
such punishment. The other 65 nations retaining the penalty do separate youths from
adults and at least 75 more have either abolished virtually all use of execution as
punishment or do not, in practice, impose the penalty. Id. From a modern viewpoint, the
numbers do not necessarily prove the nearly universal acceptance of the norm that is
required to create customary international law, and the numbers certainly were not even
this convincing years ago at the time of the creation of the human rights treaties.
258. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
259. For a brief summary of the human rights efforts of the Organization of African
Unity, see Bello, Organization of African Unity, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 270 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1983).
260. "A principle of customary law is not binding on a state that declares its dissent
from the principle during its development." RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, S 102 comment
b.
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state practice as sufficient acquiescence to bind a state.261 Dissent
from a practice cannot relieve a state of the obligation of the
customary norm unless the state's opposition has been evident
during the norm's creation. 262 One commentator, Hartman, claims
that uncertainty exists as to whether the protest must be an
affirmative renunciation or simply continued inconsistent state
practice.2 3 She suggests that an unwillingness to ratify a treaty
because a nation does not want to accept the implementation
provisions does not demonstrate a substantively opposed position
to each of the provisions therein. 26 Hartman concludes that
failure to conform is not protest enough. 265 Continued assertion
of the death penalty by courts and legislatures and the practice
of carrying out executions are not silence constituting acquies-
cence that can subject a nation to a rule of customary law. The
United States has never formally repudiated the norm but has
acted inconsistently with it throughout its evolution, thereby
avoiding the binding effect of customary law. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights concedes that the United States'
protest avoids this alleged rule of customary law.2 66
Doubt exists, therefore, as to whether either theory is viable.
Yet, Hartman proposes "to magnify the role of this comparative
component by establishing the international norm as a precise
benchmark for the interpretation of the cruel and unusual pun-
261. Acquiescence cannot bind a state to a norm, however, unless that state had actual
or constructive knowledge of the practice. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.),
1951 I.C.J. 116, 139 (Dec. 18).
262. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, S 102 comment d. Dissent from jus cogens also does
not excuse a state from compliance. Jus cogens are peremptory norms of international
law, overriding laws and agreements that conflict with them. The prohibition against the
use of force contained in the United Nations Charter is an example. Id. S 102 comment
k.
263. Hartman, supra note 7, at 684.
264. Id. at 684-85. Similarly, Hartman argues that President Carter's efforts to convince
the Senate to ratify human rights treaties by suggesting that the United States record
a reservation to the clauses dealing with the death penalty do not constitute evidence
that the United States opposed the use of the death penalty. The purpose of the
reservation, from Carter's point of view, was to increase the likelihood of the ratification
by removing political opposition. Id- at 685.
265. Id. at 686.
266. "Since the United States has protested the norm, it would not be applicable to
the United States should it be held to exist." Case 9647, supra note 45, at para. 54. The
Commission jumped to a higher level of analysis and decided that the norm in question
had achieved the status of jus cogm and any protest was irrelevant. This position is
difficult to justify given the lack of consensus as to whether enough consistent state
practice exists to warrant a finding that the norm has become customary international
law. At least one commentator laments the Commissions limited explanation for the
unprecedented assertion. Fox, supra note 155, at 601.
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ishment clause 267 to which the Supreme Court could look for a
definitive answer. Another writer concludes that no matter which
theory one utilizes, the result is the same: international practice
disfavors juvenile execution, and the United States must prohibit
juvenile execution under the eighth amendment in order to bring
the United States in line with civilized nations of the Western
Hemisphere.268
The commentators reached unconvincing conclusions because
they leave unanswered the fundamental question: Why should
courts look to international law at all in their interpretation of
a domestic constitutional matter? The international organizations
to which the United States belongs, and the respective treaties
and resolutions of each, cannot mandate the consideration of the
substance contained therein because the United States has not
ratified those that restrict the use of the death penalty. The
federal common law theory cannot withstand close analysis, and
the United States has dissented from any rule of customary
international law that may have developed to preclude the death
penalty as applied to juveniles. The Supreme Court Justices who
have made references to the practices of foreign nations made
no attempt to justify doing so.
One commentator summarily dismisses the importance of ex-
plaining why courts should consider international law.269 She asks
rhetorically what the appropriate framework for evidence is and
immediately supplies the answer: the world community. Her
justification is that the world community "is as logical as any
other."20 One need not wonder why a majority of the Justices
of the Supreme Court remain unconvinced that they should focus
their attention on anything but American legislative statistics,
and yet the appearance of international law in briefs,2 1 opinions,
and legislation continues.22 Perhaps these lawyers and judges
267. Hartman, supra note 7, at 689.
268. Comment, supra note 7, at 265.
269. Hartman, supra note 7, at 688.
270. Id.
271. "[C]andor requires internationalists to recognize that international human rights
law has not yet become a significant (or indeed, more than a marginal) factor in
constitutional decisionmaking in the minds of most constitutional lawyers, although the
number of practitioners employing international law arguments in the courts is steadily
increasing." LiUich & Hannum, Linkages Between International Human Rights and U.S.
Constitutional Law, 79 AMER. J. INT'L L. 151, 162 (1985).
272. Judges may look to international law as a source that can help them judge the
soundness of domestic policies and support liberal interpretations of the law that are
without great precedent in the United States. Congress is also mindful of international
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simply perceive that international law should matter, but quite
possibly the use of international law in judicial interpretation
legitimately arises from an obligation that international law im-
poses which those who perceive its presence have yet to articu-
late or understand.
International Law Obligations from an International Point of
View
The key to a determination of international law obligations
may be to take a fresh look at the subject from the vantage
point of an international scholar, as opposed to the above do-
mestic, constitutional approach. This approach requires a thor-
ough exploration of the sources of international law. The creation
of international law occurs in three ways: through (1) bilateral
and multilateral agreements, (2) customary law, and (3) general
principles of law that major legal systems have accepted. 3 This
Note previously discussed the nonbinding effect of current trea-
ties on the United States. The latter two sources, however, merit
further attention.
General International Law
Most international theorists and judges believe that certain
principles common to the major legal systems of the world may
supplement other rules of international law.24 These principles
law and disassociating the United States from nations perceived to be in violation of
international law, suggesting a "strong present congressional policy favoring the inter-
national human rights concept." Bilder, supra note 183, at 11. Section 502B of the Foreign
Assistance Act, for example, states that generally "no security assistance may be provided
to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violation
of internationally recognized human rights." 22 U.S.C. S 2304 (1988).
273. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, S 102(1). The Statute of the International Court of
Justice, to which the United States is a party, contains the same sources of international
law. The Statute, governing the matters brought to the International Court of Justice
(also known as the ICJ, or World Court), entered into force in 1945. S. ROSENNE, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 34 (2d rev. ed. 1985). The Statute of
the International Court of Justice authorizes the World Court to apply (a) international
conventions recognized by the contesting states, (b) international customs, (c) general
principles of law, and, at times, (d) judicial decisions and opinions of scholars. Statute of
the I.C.J., art. 38(1) (located in 15 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355, 360 (San Francisco, 1945)).
274. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 Hague Recueil 54 (1962-
II); RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, S 102(4); Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38(1M(c) (located in
15 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
355, 360 (San Francisco, 1945)).
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are "accepted by all nations in foro domestico, such as principles
of procedure, the principle of good faith, and the principle of res
judicata."' 1 One such principle is that courts should interpret
domestic law in conformity with international law to the greatest
extent possible. The Supreme Court has observed "that an act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains,' '2 6 and that a
presumption exists that legislators intended conformity unless
the drafters unmistakably intended to disregard a principle of
international comity.2 7 Courts have applied this general principle
only to federal laws. If a federal law, as opposed to a constitu-
tional provision, regarding the death penalty existed today, the
United States' own precedents would obligate the courts to
interpret such a law to conform with the bulk of the body of
international law, possibly precluding the use of the juvenile
death penalty. No such precedent exists for constitutional inter-
pretation, however, and the general principle that the courts
must interpret domestic law in conformity with international law
therefore does not justify the inclusion of international law in
the interpretation of the eighth amendment.
A modern constitutional trend has introduced an exception to
traditional ideas of the supremacy of national constitutions that
conflict with international law in the area of human rights. For
instance, the Federal Republic of Germany's constitution pro-
vides: "The general rules of public international law are an
integral part of the federal law. They shall take precedence over
the laws and shall directly create rights and duties for the
inhabitants of the federal territory."' 8 Spain similarly adopted a
constitutional article expressly requiring courts to interpret con-
stitutional rights "in conformity with the Universal Declaration
275. D. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 1983) (quoting
Procis verbeaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 1920 P.C.I.J. Advisory Comm. of
Jurists (L.N. Pub.), at 335 (June 16-July24) (Lord Phillimore (Great Britain)).
276. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
277. Schroeder v. Bissell (The Over the Top), 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925). Interna-
tional comity is a rule based upon a consistent practice of nations that is unaccompanied
by a sense of obligation which courts sometimes interchange with "international law." D.
HARRIS, supra note 275, at 35. Arguably, one likewise should presume that the Framers,
themselves lawmakers, acted in accordance with the law of nations. This approach is
unproductive, however, because obviously one could expect conformity with international
law only as it exis~ted at the time of lawmaking, and the recognition of international
human rights is a recent phenomenon.
278. "The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 50 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1990).
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of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements
on those matters ratified by Spain." 9
Despite this trend to accept international human rights as
supreme over constitutional law, such is not the case in the
United States. Courts in the United States must interpret inter-
national law within the confines of the Constitution,20 and the
treaty power cannot authorize that which the Constitution for-
bids.21 The courts' present adherence to the traditional rules
prevents the adoption of any international law that conflicts with
the Constitution.
Customary Law Revisited
At one time, the conclusion that prohibition of the juvenile
death penalty either does not exist as a matter of customary law
or that the United States' protest of the norm excuses the United
States from the norm's application ended the inquiry into the
effect of customary international law. This Note proposes that
one aspect of customary international law merits further explo-
ration: the new rule of customary law that requires a court to
consider international law as part of its decisionmaking process.
The usual approach to customary law may best be understood
as rules of specific substantive law. In other words, defense
lawyers and various amici groups traditionally commenced a
search to determine whether the practice of most nations pro-
hibited executions of juveniles under the age of eighteen in order
to prove the existence of a particular rule of customary law.
These juvenile death penalty opponents sought to use customary
law to force deviating nations to adopt the dominant practice,
arguing that their nonconformance breached international law.
As discussed previously, opponents could not prove definitively
the existence of a rule of customary law that would prevent the
execution of juveniles under the age of eighteen.
Other substantive rules of customary law do exist, however.
In order to demonstrate that the prohibition of the juvenile death
penalty is of a specificity not yet evident in customary interna-
tional law and to show the distinction between the traditional
rules and the rule that this Note proposes, a brief review of the
279. "The Spanish Constitution," 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3
(A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1990).
280. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion).
281. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
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existing substantive rules of customary law in the area of human
rights is necessary. A state violates customary rules of interna-
tional human rights law, for example, if:
As a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or con-
dones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights. 2
The rights that subsections (a)-(f) enunciate are at the core of
human dignity and are therefore peremptory norms such that
even an international agreement in violation of those rights would
be void.m An analysis of subsection (g) reveals the accepted rule
that no single or sporadic violation of any other recognized human
right is, in and of itself, a violation of international law unless
that right is intrinsic to human dignity. Although all of the rights
contained in the Universal Declaration, for example, are "inter-
nationally recognized," not all are fundamental.m
Unlike the substantive rules discussed above, a new rule of
international law is now emerging that, unlike every justification
so far discussed, may not merely suggest looking to international
law but may actually mandate its consideration. This new rule
requires that a court consider the body of international law
relevant to human rights whenever an individual's fundamental
rights are in jeopardy. Not only must a court be aware of
infringing upon the rights to which an individual's national citi-
zenship entitles him, but the court also must ascertain whether
any rights attach under international law.25 This rule is proce-
282. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, 5 702.
283. Id. comment n.
284. Id. comment m.
285. Such an inquiry would include a review of relevant substantive rules of customary
law, see supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text, and the major human rights documents,
see supra notes 102, 114, 123, 136, 161 and accompanying text. The fact that a nation is
not a party to a particular document does not preclude the obligation to consider its
contents. Undoubtedly, for example, every individual has the right to live without the
threat of genocide. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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dural in that a consideration of international law is one of the
steps that a court must take to comply with this international
requirement, which is analogous to procedural due process. The
requirement does not necessarily require the court to adhere to
the substantive rules found therein, but the court must at least
consider these substantive rules.
One can best explore the emerging procedural rule of custom-
ary law in the context of the state responsibility doctrine, which
encompasses the rights of aliens. 8 In that area, a longstanding
debate exists as to whether the state -responsibility doctrine
requires nations to afford aliens the minimal rights of nationals
of the state in which the aliens are living, or whether the doctrine
requires the nation to provide an internationally agreed upon
minimum, regardless of the nation's treatment of its own peo-
ple.m
In the 1950's, the General Assembly requested the United
Nations Law Commission to undertake the codification of state
responsibility.2 Special Rapporteur Dr. Garcia-Amador was in-
novative in his reports, relying on the newly emerging interna-
tional law of human rights to attempt to bridge the gap between
nations adhering to the international minimum standard approach
and those applying the national treatment concept.289 Rather than
attempting to codify the substantive requirements for the treat-
Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. supp. at
7 (1951); Judgment, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 175 (1947) (quoting the Tribunal Charter, art. 6(c)); Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N part 2, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/34110
(1979); Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second
Session, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N part 2, at 14, 69 art. 193)(c), U.N. Doe. A135/10
(1980); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5). A nation has no defense in a claim that its citizens did not have the right to be
free of genocide because that nation had not ratified the Convention on Genocide. Even
if this hypothetical nation was not a member of the UN or any other international
organization, if the nation engaged in the practice of genocide, the nation clearly would
be violating international human rights law. Although genocide is an extreme and obvious
example, other instances in which state practice violates an individual's international
rights require the same result. If membership in the class of human beings bestows
rights on individuals, which is clear, then a state logically cannot prevent the vesting of
such rights by failing to ratify a written document. A nation must therefore consider all
major relevant multilateral treaties that express fundamental human rights.
286. Aliens are persons not presently residing or located in the country of their
nationality. R. BLEDSOE & B. BOCZEK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DICTIONARY 121 (1987).
287. Lillich, Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, III ACADtMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 329, 343-56 (1978).
288. Id. at 373.
289. Id. at 374-76.
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ment of aliens, Garcia-Amador proposed that nations accord aliens
the rights that nationals enjoy, which in any case should not be
less than the fundamental human rights contained within the
major international instruments. ° This proposal would force a
nation to consult the major human rights treaties whether dealing
with nationals or aliens, even when the nation was not a party
to the treaties and therefore would not otherwise be legally
bound.
The commentary to the proposed article listed the following
documents as contemporary international instruments that nations
should consider: United Nations Charter, OAS Charter, American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal
Declaration, European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.2 1 Of course, not every right that these
instruments protect is fundamental.2 2 In the criminal punishment
area, Garcia-Amador listed as fundamental such rights as the
right to be presumed innocent, the right to a speedy trial, the
right to speak in one's own defense, and the right to counsel.2 3
Although the enumeration clearly is nonexhaustive, noticeably
absent in the documents are any specifics, such as the permissible
number of days that may pass between an arrest and trial. This
approach shifted the focus from compiling a list of alien rights
to directing states' attentions to standards of international human
rights law which states must consider in order to avoid commit-
ting a breach. The reports of Garcia-Amador codified only general
principles of state responsibility and did not "spell out the content
of obligations whose breach entails state responsibility." 294
The concept that Garcia-Amador understood and applied within
the context of the treatment of aliens is that a new procedural
rule of customary law has emerged which requires a state,
although acting in matters that are domestic in nature, to con-
sider the fundamental rights that the major human rights instru-
ments define in order to comply with international law. This
theory requires a state to consider international law, as contained
within the treaties, in all matters that affect the human rights
that international law gives to individuals and is therefore quite
wide in its scope.
290. Id. at 375.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 376.
294. Id. at 378.
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The procedural rule of customary law that requires a nation
to consult international human rights law is evident in the deci-
sions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Barcelona
Traction Case,25 the World Court considered the obligations that
a state assumed upon admitting foreign investors into its terri-
tory. In this case, the Spanish government caused injury to a
Canadian corporation within its territory.28 After Canada failed
to espouse the claim, Belgium nationals who held a majority of
the issued shares brought suit against Spain due to the injury
to Belgian shareholders.2 7 Spain objected that Belgium lacked
standing to bring suit, as the injury was to a corporation and
not individuals.2 8 The ICJ found that Spain had obligations con-
cerning the treatment to be afforded foreigners, whether they
were natural persons or juristic persons such as corporations.29
Speaking within the context of these obligations, however, the
court found:
[Ain essential distinction should be drawn between the obli-
gations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.300
In other words, the ICJ distinguished between the general treat-
ment of foreigners, including corporate entities, and the more
specific relationship between the Spanish government and the
Canadian corporation. All nations, even strangers to the corpo-
ration, would have an interest and therefore standing to bring
suit against Spain if the injuries contravened human rights law.
The ICJ mentioned as relevant such international human rights
laws as the prohibitions against genocide, acts of aggression,
slavery, and racial discrimination. 31 Knowledge of this type of
violative practice justifies a nation in bringing a suit, thereby
essentially fulfilling its obligation towards the international com-
295. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5).
296. Id. at 7-10.
297. Id. at 7, 11.
298. Id. at 14.
299. Id. at 32.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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munity to guard against human rights violations. On the other
hand, when the injury is the result of nondiscriminatory bank-
ruptcy laws operating in a manner adverse to the corporation,
as here, only injured parties may bring suit.30 2
The distinction drawn between obligations to the international
community and the more specific relationship between two coun-
tries is relevant to the death penalty cases. Because individuals
derive rights from international law as well as from their national
state, a court must analyze more than domestic law to determine
whether a violation of individual rights exists. An analysis of
international law is important because, as the ICJ found, a state
is obligated to the international community to uphold and enforce
international law, a large part of which focuses on the protection
of individuals. As a matter of procedure, then, in deciding a
domestic case involving human rights, the courts of the United
States must consult the body of international law before render-
ing judgment, as must the courts of every other nation.
The World Court has also relied on this recently developed
requirement of ascertaining international obligations for domestic
affairs to impose the principle of self-determination found in the
United Nations Charter °30 for the benefit of all territories. The
World Court found that "the subsequent development of inter-
national law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as en-
shrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle
of self-determination applicable to all of them.' '30 4 The World
Court construed other instruments, such as the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples,305 as constituting crucial stages in the development of the
law, in which principles of self-determination are now pervasive.
The court found that it must consider the development of the
302. The injured party in this case was the corporation, which was a creature of
Canadian law, and therefore only Canada had standing to bring suit even though Belgium
nationals held 88% of the shares. The court noted that the result would have been
different if the act complained of had infringed on the direct rights of the shareholders.
When the injury is to the company, however, and the shareholders feel the repercussions,
they may look only to the company for redress of the injuries, "for although two separate
entities may have suffered from the same wrong, it is only one entity whose rights have
been infringed." Id. at 35.
303. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
304. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
305. G.A. Res. 1514, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 188, U.N. Doc. AIL.323 and Add.1-
6 (1960).
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law in order to faithfully discharge its functions. In other words,
the World Court considered other international instruments of
human rights so as to ascertain generally accepted principles
regarding self-determination and applied these principles to the
case, completely outside of and in addition to holding a state
responsible for the content of instruments that it has ratified.
More recently, similar reasoning appeared in the World Court's
opinion in Nicaragua v. United States,306 which involved a dispute
over responsibility for military and paramilitary activity in Ni-
caragua. First, the court found the laying of mines by the United
States to be a breach of the principles of humanitarian law that
underlie the Hague Convention No. VIII of 1907.307 Second, even
though Nicaragua failed to refer the World Court to four appli-
cable Geneva Conventions in presenting its case, the court de-
clared that the "United States is under an obligation to 'respect'
the Conventions and even to 'ensure respect' for them. . . . This
obligation derives from the general principles of humanitarian
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression. ' 8
Again, the World Court made clear a nation's duty to consult
the body of human rights law whenever it acts or decides not to
act.
The most recent edition of the Restatement on the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States3 9 recognizes nations' obliga-
tions to consider international human rights law as a matter of
customary law. Comment o of section 702 proclaims that viola-
tions of the human rights norms delineated in that section310 are
a breach of an obligation to all states and allows a state to pursue
the ordinary remedies available upon a violation of its rights
under customary law. More explicitly, comment m provides that
a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights31' would be responsible for a single breach of the funda-
mental rights listed therein, but that "any state is liable under
customary law for a consistent pattern of violations of any such
right as state policy. 3 1 2 The underlying rule thus surfaces again;
that is, a nation must look to international law and consider fully
306. 1985-86 I.C.J.Y.B. 137 (1986) (summarizing Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
307. Id. at 150-51.
308. Id. at 151.
309. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, § 702.
310. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 114.
312. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195, § 702 comment m (emphasis added).
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its content to be sure the nation does not violate that law.
Although the rule is not stated in so many words, the rule is
implicit in the notion that responsibility can arise in the arena
of human rights law without a nation's express consent.3 13
Applying this obligation to the death penalty context, just as
a jury must consider the offender's youth as a mitigating factor,
so must the Supreme Court consider international norms.3 14 The
jury may find, however, that although youth is mitigating, youth
is not enough to relieve the offender of the death penalty because
of the existence of overwhelming aggravating circumstances.
Similarly, international law requires the Court to consider the
body of human rights law in making its determination. Rejecting
the use of these norms outright, as the plurality did in Stanford
and Wilkins, violates the emerging rule of customary interna-
tional law that requires the consideration of human rights law.
A finding that international norms do not mitigate the result
would not be a breach of international law because, at a minimum,
the Court considered the norms.
CONCLUSION: APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Applying the recurring theme of the cases of the ICJ to the
Stanford and Wilkins cases reveals the error of the view that
international law is irrelevant to the determination of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment. All nations must consider the evolving law of human
rights, and every nation must act in compliance with the funda-
mental rights of this law, as codified in the human rights instru-
ments.
313. The rules on dissenting from an emerging custom are fully applicable to this rule
as well. The United States, however, cannot claim to have dissented from a rule that
requires a nation to consider an individual's internationally given human rights, because
United States' courts have participated in the formation of the rule as recently as 1988
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion). In Thompson, a
plurality of the Court looked to international law in striking down Oklahoma's death
penalty law, which operated without regard to age.
314. Although the four Justices claiming that international law is irrelevant arguably
have "considered" such law in that the dissenting Justices exposed them to it, mere
exposure is not enough. At the least, in order to comply with international law, the
Justices must be willing to actually consider international practice even if they later find
that international law is not dispositive in the particular case. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Because of the unlikelihood that the Senate will ratify any of
the present human rights treaties31 5 to some, "[d]omestic enforce-
ment of customary norms has become the promising new frontier
for human rights proponents in the United States."3 16 In the
context of the death penalty, however, the establishment of a
rule of customary law prohibiting the execution of juveniles is
tenuous at best, and nothing obligates the United States to honor
any rule that might exist due to its clear and consistent dissent
from the formation of the norm. Although the outlook for juven-
iles on death row is not so promising if premised on traditional
customary law,317 the Supreme Court could take a step in the
right direction by acknowledging its obligation to consider the
content of the law of fundamental human rights. 18
Because only fundamental rights are binding, no hope exists
that even looking to the law of human rights will presently
change the outcome of the juvenile death penalty cases, which
depend upon the drawing of a line at a particular age. Neverthe-
less, looking to international law will set a precedent in the
context of the eighth amendment. After all, if "international
human rights law influences domestic law only indirectly, rather
than directly, this would seem no reason for disappointment."31 9
Over time, the cases may present the Court with such a clear
and compelling world view of what constitutes cruel punishment
that the Court will have no choice but to overrule Stanford and
Wilkins and the cases that may follow in their wake.
Laura Dalton
315. Hartman, supra note 7, at 657.
316. Id.
317. The courts often avoid even principles as well-established as customary interna-
tional law. The courts' hesitancy may be attributable to their reluctance to admit
insufficiency in United States' laws or the need to turn to other nations. The courts also
may be unsure of the field of international human rights law, due to its comparatively
recent creation and still evolving nature. See generally Bilder, supra note 183, at 8-9.
318. Motivation to consult international law does exist in that, even though courts are
concerned with the embarrassment of admitting that the United States is not a perfect
model of human rights, international exposure revealing less than humane, judicially
condoned activity might be equally, ff not more, embarrassing. See id.
319. Id. at 9-10.
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